Т	IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT					
2	FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS					
3	HOUSTON DIVISION					
4	IN RE: §	CASE NO. 21-30923-11 HOUSTON, TEXAS				
5	GRIDDY ENERGY, LLC, §	WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 2021				
6		3:02 P.M. TO 4:59 P.M.				
7	CONFIRMATION HEAR	RING (VIA ZOOM)				
8	CONFIRMATION HEARING (VIA ZOOM)					
9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARVIN ISGUR UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE					
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12	APPEARANCES:	SEE NEXT PAGE				
13	COURTROOM DEPUTY:	TYLER LAWS				
14	(Recorded via CourtSpeak; No log notes)					
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25	(Please also see Electronic Appearances.)				

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3	EXHIBITS:		Offered	Received
4	DEBTOR'S:		Offered	Received
5	Ex. 312 Ex. 338-2		36	36 7
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## HOUSTON, TEXAS; WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 2021; 3:02 P.M.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. We're here this afternoon in the Griddy Energy case. It's 21-30923. We have electronic appearances that have been made so what I would like to do is to go directly to Debtor's counsel, ask you to press five, star on your phone, and let me ask you where you intend to go today. You can then make an opening statement. And if anyone else wishes to make an opening statement, they may do so as well.

MS. SPIGEL: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: Ms. Spigel, good afternoon to you.

MS. SPIGEL: Thank you, Your Honor, Robin Spigel, Baker Botts, counsel to the Debtor. With me in the virtual courtroom is Michael Fallquist, the Debtor's Chief Executive Officer; Roop Bhullar, the Debtor's Chief Financial Officer; and Tony Spencer, the Debtor's retained expert.

There are three items on the agenda today.

There's a motion to approve settlement between the Debtor and the State of Texas, a motion to seal certain customer data in connection with the expert report filed by the Debtor, and the combined hearing on the confirmation of Griddy's Chapter 11 plan, as well as final approval of the disclosure statement.

As I reported last week, Your Honor, the plan was overwhelmingly accepted by voting classes, and no formal

objections to the plan or the disclosure statement were filed. There were a few informal comments to the plan that were received and is reflected and the resolutions that are reflected in the confirmation order. And we can go over that in a little bit.

I thought that it made sense to go -- proceed first with the motion to approve the settlement between the Debtor and the State of Texas.

THE COURT: So let me see if anyone has any sort of comment about proceeding that way. I actually -- the reason I didn't deal with that on the certificate of no objection was only because I thought it was so tied to whether we were going to confirm the plan that that should largely be a joint decision. If you think I should take them up separately, you know, given where the world is where we're here on pretty well an unopposed day, I don't know that it's going to matter a lot. But that's the reason I didn't was to believing that they were pretty well integrated. Even if you read the settlement it says that parts of it only come about if we confirm a plan. So if anyone else wishes to address the Court on that issue, please press five, star. Otherwise we can go there as a starting point. Let me see if I have it.

(No audible response)

All right. No one else seems to want to run

interference against you so why don't you move ahead,
Ms. Spigel, with -- we'll go that way.

MS. SPIGEL: Thank you, Your Honor. And they are integrally tied. In fact, and I'll get to that in a second, but the settlement is dependent on the plan going effective, and part of the settlement is integrated in the plan. So it is subject to -- even if Your Honor approves it, it's subject ultimately to confirmation and then the plan going effective. But I will go through it.

The Debtor's motion to approve the settlement between the Debtor and its parent company, Griddy Holdings, LLC, and the State of Texas was filed at Docket Number 338. As the Debtor previewed at the hearing on conditional approval of disclosure statement, the Debtor had reached a settlement agreement with it and its parent company on the one hand, with the State of Texas on the other hand. The settlement agreement is attached to the proposed order approving the motion as Exhibit 1. And next to the settlement agreement is a copy of a consent judgment that I'll explain shortly.

The certificate of service respecting the service of the motion can be found at Docket 343.

As a preliminary matter, Your Honor, the Debtor would like to at this time move to admit the Fallquist declaration in support of the motion is attached as

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Exhibit B to the motion at Docket Number 338-2.
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   Mr. Fallquist is on the line and available for cross
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   examination.
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              THE COURT: All right. Is there any objection to
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    the admission of 338-2, which is Mr. Fallquist's
   declaration?
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          (No audible response)
8
              All right. Mr. Fallquist's declaration is
   admitted.
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          (Debtor's Exhibit Number 338-2 was received in
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11
   evidence)
              MS. SPIGEL: Thank you, Your Honor. There were no
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   objections filed to the motion. A certificate of no
    objection had been filed on July 1st at Docket Number 364.
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   And then we actually filed an amended certificate of no
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   objection on July 2nd to fix some signature pages to the
    consent judgment just due to personnel changes. That's at
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   Docket Number 369. Unless you have any questions that
    concerns the substance of the motion.
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              THE COURT: No. Let me hear if there's anyone
    that believes that this settlement is not appropriate or
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    should not be granted.
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          (No audible response)
              Mr. Gibbs, I know that you filed a statement in
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support of the plan and I think it incorporates your

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client's support of this settlement. I just want to be sure that I'm reading that correctly and I'm not making a mistake about that. And I also know Mr. Binford has said he wants to speak. So let me get the two of your lines active, and then anyone else. Mr. Gibbs.

MR. GIBBS: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Chuck
Gibbs with the law firm of McDermott, Will, and Emery.
We're counsel for the Official Unsecured Creditors
Committee. We support the entry of an order approving this settlement. As Your Honor correctly indicated, we filed a general statement in support of confirmation of the plan which necessarily also supports the approval of this compromise with the Attorney General. That was filed yesterday at Docket 382 so I just wanted the Court and the record to reflect that we are supportive of this motion. I think it's entirely appropriate and obviously critical component of the plan that you're about to hear.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from Mr. Binford.

MR. BINFORD: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Jason
Binford with the Office of the Texas Attorney General. Just
wanted to say that normally I appear in this Court on behalf
of the State of Texas. Today I'm appearing on behalf of the
Public Utility Commission of Texas, and that's an important
distinction for these purposes. Ms. Ryan and Ms. Obaldo are

on the line for the State of Texas relating to the settlement agreement. I just wanted to say on the record that the State of Texas, as it's defined in this settlement agreement, does not include the Public Utility Commission of Texas. It's a separate entity for these purposes. Just wanted to put that on the record.

THE COURT: And does the PUC, who I understand is not a settling party, have any objection to the settlement with the State of Texas?

MR. BINFORD: Absolutely not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And does the Debtor want to proceed with the settlement knowing, if you didn't already, that the PUC does not consider itself part of the State for the purposes of this motion only? I assume otherwise it might.

MS. SPIGEL: Well, I guess I will say this, Your Honor. The settlement is with the State of Texas, and the releases are specific with respect to the Consumer Protection Division of Texas. So to the extent that I don't know the agencies well enough to know, you know, whether the PUCT could bring the same actions as the Consumer Protection Division of Texas could bring. But we would fully expect that the releases, as they're narrowly tailored, would be --would apply to the PUCT to the extent that it could bring the same types of claims as the Consumer Protection Division. My understanding that those claims are of course

limited to the deceptive Texas practices act and things like that. But, you know, --

THE COURT: So Ms. Ryan --

MS. SPIGEL: -- it's just not --

THE COURT: -- wants to talk. Maybe she can add some clarity to this for us. Ms. Ryan?

MS. RYAN: Well I certainly hope I can add some clarity, Your Honor. For the record it's Abigail Ryan with the Office of the Texas Attorney General representing the Office of the Texas Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division.

Your Honor, I echo what Ms. Spigel says in that our settlement is between the Office of the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division who has brought a case in State Court against Griddy alleging violations of the DTPA. And so it is narrowly tailored to exhibit the DTPA allegations that were brought or could have been brought in State Court or Bankruptcy Court. And so that's what our settlement covers, Your Honor.

We believe that it was truly an arm's length conduction. We fought hard to get the consumer protections that we needed in this consent judgment that Ms. Spiegel will go over in a moment. And the Debtor fought hard for the things they wanted as well. And I think that this settlement has really fulfilled the needs of the Consumer

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Protection Division for the State of Texas and as well as
balancing the needs of the bankrupt, Your Honor. So I hope
that added some clarity to your --
          THE COURT: Well maybe --
          MS. RYAN: -- question. If not, we'll --
          THE COURT: Take a look at -- the settlement is
with Texas. It isn't with the CID. Paragraph six is called
a "Release By Texas." And I need to know if we have
confusion over what's going on. I need to be able to rule
on it today and I don't want to leave the ambiguity in
there. Because I'm looking at paragraph six, Texas releases
everybody.
         MS. RYAN: Yes, Your Honor. And I am scrolling
through it. I thought I had this earmarked. We had put in
here a definition defining what the State of Texas is;
because, Your Honor, at this point we only represent the
Consumer Protection Division of the State of Texas.
Theoretically I couldn't release any claims TCQ may have,
just as an example, it was none that I know of. And so the
State of Texas is very broad. Let me flip through and see
or if, Ms. Spigel, you remember where we put in this was
limited to the Consumer Protection Division.
         THE COURT: So --
         MS. RYAN: I believe it is further down in
paragraph six that State of Texas or Texas hereby fully
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releases, waives, and discharge Defendants and their present and former officers, agents, so forth, so on, subject to the injunction in the consent judgment from any claims arising out of, related to, facts alleged in the action, which is defined as our State Court action, which was brought by the State of Texas Consumer Protection Division that could have been brought in State Court, Bankruptcy Court, or any court of competent jurisdiction by the Consumer Protection Division of the Texas Attorney General's Office. And so we thought, Your Honor, that that narrowed it to the Consumer Protection Division. If you would like further clarity I am open to putting further clarity in there.

THE COURT: So again I want to figure out what people are trying to say here. Let's assume the Consumer Protection Division has the right because of the Debtor's or its officers' conduct during the freeze -- and I'm not saying it did have the right -- to collect some sort of damages from them, money damages. And let's also assume that the PUC would have had the right to collect money damages from that same conduct. Are you telling me that this release would incorporate the CID's ability to collect money damages but not the PUC's ability to collect money damages --

MS. RYAN: Your Honor, --

THE COURT: -- out of the same offense?

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MS. RYAN: -- I believe that it would not cut off
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    the -- if the PUCT has the right to bring similar causes of
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    action under a statute of theirs, it wouldn't cut off the
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    PUCT's right to do that. It's the Consumer Protection
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    Division through the Texas DTPA statute where they get their
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   power to bring those actions. And it's my understanding
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    that only the Consumer Protection Division of the Texas
   Attorney General's Office can bring certain DTPA claims as
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    we did in State Court before this bankruptcy was filed and
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    that those rights don't belong to another State agency.
              THE COURT: So this --
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             MR. BINFORD: Your Honor, if I could add to that.
             THE COURT: Yeah. Who was speaking there?
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             MR. BINFORD: This is Jason Binford on behalf of
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    the PUCT.
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              THE COURT: Yeah. Go ahead, Mr. Binford.
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             MR. BINFORD: Your Honor, I'm really not trying to
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    spring anything on anyone. I previewed this with Debtor's
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    counsel and there's no laying behind the log here. I --
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             THE COURT: Mr. Binford, I think --
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             MR. BINFORD: If --
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              THE COURT: -- you've done the opposite of laying
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   behind the log so please don't hear my comments differently.
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    You said it right out front so there isn't laying behind the
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         I just -- I need to know what I'm being asked to
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approve.

MR. BINFORD: Well, I'll -- I agree with Ms. Ryan that the DTPA is not really a creature of the PUCT. My charge this afternoon is to keep the PUCT's powder dry and reserve all rights for future actions that are brought against the PUCT and so that no one can make an argument that we can't make -- defend ourselves adequately or make counterclaims related to those. And those seem to be a different ballpark than what's before the Court right now.

THE COURT: Ms. Spigel, what did you think you were buying? So are you buying what they're selling or --

MS. SPIGEL: So the underlying action is brought by the State of Texas, right? I mean, that is who the Plaintiff is. That's why the settlement is with the State of Texas. So the releases that were negotiated heavily relate to the facts alleged in the action and anything that could be brought, claims that could be brought by the Consumer Protection Division of Texas.

I don't -- as I said before, if the PUCT can't bring the same actions that the Consumer Protection Division of Texas can, then we have no problem with that. We understand that what the releases say. But I don't know enough about the agencies to know who can assert what. We certainly don't expect another agency of the State of Texas to be able to bring same or similar claims that are being

released pursuant to the settlement.

THE COURT: So I don't hear Mr. Binford telling you that he is in agreement with that statement. You're both telling me, I think, that you don't know if there are overlapping claims and that I am not sure there is a meeting of the minds here and want -- I want to be sure there is. If it's arising out of the same conduct on the same day, there's no question in my mind but that if the PUC has a regulatory interest, that you're not releasing a regulatory interest. But what if it is a money damages interest? And I think both of you all are telling me you don't know if there is a money damages claim here let's say against an officer or the company. If you don't know if that's being released then I don't know what I'm signing. And I want to know what you all are intending to do.

MS. RYAN: Your Honor, if I may speak. This is
Mrs. Ryan with the Attorney General's Office. I think that
maybe I have a forest for the trees problem here. Being in
the State of Texas and working as an assistant attorney
general, I work for many different State agencies as you can
imagine. And so when I define the State of Texas it's a
pretty large definition because we have many, many State
agencies. In this case, however, the State Court case,
which is being settled, was brought by the State of Texas by
and through the Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney

General's Office. And so it was narrowed down to just the Consumer Protection Division. It wasn't all the myriad State agencies.

And so what we were trying to get at in the settlement is we're settling the DTPA claims that we raised in the State Court suit through our Consumer Protection Division. The PUC, as confirmed, does not have the right to bring DTPA claims and --

THE COURT: So this isn't anything that were or could have been brought in a Texas State Court by the Consumer Protection Division. What if what you could have brought is the same as what the PUC could bring? Texas is giving a release out of that. That's why I think there isn't a meeting of the mind. Now, maybe --

MS. RYAN: So I think --

THE COURT: -- the Debtor's willing to live without that meeting of the minds. I don't know. But I'm not sure that I am prepared to live with the ambiguity.

MS. RYAN: I appreciate that, Your Honor. And I think a clarifying point could be made to say if we need --well, if we need. Obviously we need to amend the documents we filed. We could say the State of Texas by and through the Texas Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division solely, and so it narrows it to only the Consumer Protection Division and only those DTPA claims that the Consumer

1 Protection Division as part of the Attorney General's office 2 had the right to bring. There's no other State agency --3 THE COURT: Yeah. I just don't know if that's 4 what the Debtor thought they were getting. They may not be 5 willing to use that. Maybe they are. If they are I can do 6 that with the stroke of a typewriter. 7 MS. SPIGEL: I would -- I need to look at the 8 complaint because I thought the complaint was not specific 9 to the Consumer Protection Division. If it was, then it's 10 probably fine. I mean, could we have a five -- I hate to do 11 this in the middle, you know, we have a confirmation hearing 12 we'd like to get through, but could I have a five-minute recess to look at the complaint and then to just talk to my 13 14 client very quickly? Because --15 THE COURT: Of course you can. 16 MS. SPIGEL: -- we don't want to put this off. 17 THE COURT: Of course you can. I just want to be 18 sure that I know what I'm being asked to sign, and that 19 needs to be that you and Ms. Ryan and Mr. Binford all agree 20 on what the intent is of the document. And I don't know 21 that I have a particular concern with one possibility, which 22 is when's the proof of claim deadline for the PUC? 23 MS. SPIGEL: It's September 13th. 24 THE COURT: Can I ask Mr. Binford if the PUC has a 25 non-regulatory claim, so a money claim, is it looking to

assert that solely for setoff rights or will it be looking if it has a money claim to be sharing in any distributions to the unsecured pool of creditors?

MR. BINFORD: Your Honor, the PUCT is not -- does not consider itself a creditor in this case. I don't see us filing a proof of claim, not only because we don't have a monetary interest but also because it's also my charge to not waive sovereign immunity if I can get away with it. And so we won't be filing a proof of claim in this case.

The main thing that I'm trying to maintain, and this is also through the opt-out that I made sure was in the version of the confirmation order that's been presented, is to keep all of my defensive arrows in my quiver if people come calling in the future. So that's really what I'm after, is ensuring that we can fully defend ourselves if some party in relation to this case post-confirmation comes calling.

THE COURT: That's very helpful, and I appreciate that clarification. It certainly would -- adding something to that effect is going to resolve my concern over leaving this as an open issue. It may or may not resolve Ms. Spigel's concern.

I will tell you that I think the sovereign immunity question may have been resolved in 1846 but I will let you speak to the founders about that question. We

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aren't -- I'm not going to try and address it today.
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              How long do you want, Ms. Spigel? I'll give you
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   as long as you want. Ms. Spigel, 1846 --
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              MS. SPIGEL: I think I --
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              THE COURT: -- is when the sovereign State of
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    Texas, where I was born, gave up its sovereignty and became
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    a state and became bound by the Constitution of the United
    States, for those of you that aren't from here. We've tried
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    to make you welcome but that still doesn't make you a Texan,
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   Ms. Spigel.
              MS. SPIGEL: I think I'll become an honorary one.
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    Thank you. I think I just need honestly maybe like five
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   minutes --
              THE COURT: Sure.
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              MS. SPIGEL: -- if you don't mind.
              THE COURT: We'll come back --
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             MS. SPIGEL: Maybe we could go -- come back at
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    4:30.
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              THE COURT: We'll come back at 3:30. And if you
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   need more time, just let me know then.
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              MS. SPIGEL: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Thank you.
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          (Recess taken from 3:25 p.m. to 3:31 p.m.)
              THE COURT: Mr. Binford, it looks like that I made
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    an error on that and Texas joined the Union on December 29th
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of 1845. I think I was off by three days.
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MR. BINFORD: I would say that I was going to correct Your Honor but I did not understand the distinction either.

MR. GIBBS: Your Honor, I wasn't born here but I had to help my kids with their homework and they had to Texas history in school so I might have been able to guess within five years.

THE COURT: Ms. Spigel, --

MS. SPIGEL: Your --

THE COURT: -- how are we?

MS. SPIGEL: Your Honor, can I have another five minutes? I apologize. Jason -- I just want to give Jason a call.

THE COURT: You don't need to apologize at all.

Just, look, I should have said this at the beginning of the hearing, Ms. Spigel. You know, Texas had a disaster and it was a disaster for your company as well. It could have resulted in this case just itself being a ridiculous exercise in litigation and unnecessary fights. And what you all have come together to do is a really amazing accomplishment. You take as much time as you need. I'm not trying to rush you with these five-minute breaks. I'm trying to facilitate the good work you've been doing. So you tell me how long you want. It's just in these COVID

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days, I've got to come back out because there's no one, you
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    know, saying, okay, we're ready. So how much time do you
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    want? I'll give you what you want.
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              MS. SPIGEL: Why don't we say 3:45? Just it
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    hopefully will be done by then. I --
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              THE COURT: We'll see you then. Thank you.
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              MS. RYAN: Robin, --
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              MR. BINFORD: Your Honor, I'll just say,
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   Ms. Spigel, I'm on my cellphone so why don't I give you a
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    call? And actually we might set up a conference call and
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    have Ms. Ryan on as well.
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             MS. RYAN: Yeah. I think I --
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             MR. BINFORD: I'll --
              MS. RYAN: -- can have some clarity for you,
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   Ms. Spigel.
              MR. BINFORD: I'll email -- Ms. Spigel and
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   Ms. Ryan, I will email you a conference line right at this
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    very minute.
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              THE COURT: We're going to come back at five
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   minutes until 4:00, so not at 3:45 like you asked for.
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              Okay. Thank you. Five until 4:00.
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              MS. SPIGEL: Thank you. Okay. Thank you.
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          (Recess taken from 3:33 p.m. to 3:54 p.m.)
                            AFTER RECESS
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              THE COURT: All right. Ms. Spigel, what did you
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    all figure out?
              MS. SPIGEL: Your Honor, can you hear me?
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              THE COURT: I can.
                                  Thank you.
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              MS. SPIGEL: Okay. Thank you. I think Ms. Ryan
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    will put a statement on the record but I think there has
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   been a meeting of the minds, and with her statement that
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    will clarify what's intended by the releases and how they
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    work.
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              THE COURT: Perfect. Thank you. Ms. Ryan, let me
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    see if I need to get your line active again. Ms. Ryan and
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   Mr. Binford, I've got you all back on the line again.
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              MS. RYAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Can you hear
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   me?
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              THE COURT: I can. Thank you, Ms. Ryan.
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              MS. RYAN:
                         Okay. So we do have a meeting of the
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   minds. Thank you for that short break so that we could all
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   be on the same page.
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              So to start with, the Consumer Protection Division
   has power to bring certain claims under Texas DTPA and other
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    statutes. And these powers only belong to the State of
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    Texas' Consumer Protection Division. No State agency can
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    bring these claims.
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              And these aren't for damages. Generally these are
    for injunctive relief, they are for restitution, and they're
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    for civil fines and penalties.
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Here, Your Honor, the claims that the State of
Texas is settling are only the claims that were brought or
could have been brought by the Attorney General's Consumer
Protection Division. This doesn't affect any claims or
causes of action that any State agency, including the PUCT,
may have. It's clearly just the Consumer Protection
Division's claims or causes of action that were brought or
could have been brought by the State of Texas.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. SPIGEL: And, Your Honor, as we understand it, that there is the PUCT does not or has its own set of claims and causes of actions that it can bring against different parties but they don't overlap with the Consumer Protection Division. And so there is — there would be no concern with the language that is in the release because the PUCT couldn't bring those types of claims that the Consumer Protection Division can bring.

MS. RYAN: That's exactly right, Your Honor. I agree exactly what Ms. Spigel said. And if you do need more elaboration on these powers and why they don't extend to State agencies, I have the head of the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division on the line and on the video if you have questions for him.

THE COURT: So I have one question. And I'm not sure who you want to answer it so I'll leave that up to you.

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I understand that there are powers for what you're telling
me in the consumer division that others can't exercise. Are
there any powers that the consumer division has that others
can also exercise? So I --
         MS. RYAN: Your Honor, if you'll unmute --
          THE COURT: So if I think of a Venn diagram, you
know, I'm trying to figure out what's the overlap on the
Venn diagram, if you will talk to me in math terms.
         MS. RYAN: Absolutely. And it's funny because
that's exactly how Ms. Spiegel and I were talking about
this. And there is no overlap, Your Honor, --
         THE COURT: And that --
         MS. RYAN: -- in our presentation.
          THE COURT: -- answers the question. If there's
none then there's none. That means I understand exactly
what's written based on the parties' statements. All right.
Sorry about -- I'm sorry. But, look, it's really important
to me that I enforce my orders. And I've learned don't sign
something that you don't understand what it means because
then when it comes time to enforce it you've got a real
problem. And people rely on me to enforce the orders.
That's why I'm trying to ask these questions. You all have
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was my lack of knowledge that made me question whether there

answered them. I'm satisfied with the answers, I'm

satisfied that the document now -- or always made sense.

was a problem. And I don't think there is.

So with that said, we have the evidence in the record. I don't believe anyone is objecting. But let me hear if anyone wishes to object to the order that was filed at 369. I'm going to look through it and thumb through it a little bit but please press five, star and let me know.

MR. GIBBS: Your Honor, can you hear me? This is Chuck Gibbs.

THE COURT: Mr. Gibbs, I can hear you fine.

MR. GIBBS: Thank you. We are supportive of the entry of the order. I just need to get one clarification as you -- are the comments of counsel for the PUCT part of the record that Your Honor is relying upon in approving this order? Because I understood them to say it's not their intention to be filing a proof of claim in this case, that their reservation of rights today, which I understood them to -- and why they were making it was to retain, as counsel indicated, their defensive arrows in their quiver. But we wanted it to be clear that if they're reserving -- making it clear they're not a party to settlement that they're not later going to be -- for a distribution that my constituency is expected to give in this case.

THE COURT: That is what they told me. I will rely on that when we get to the confirmation hearing in determining whether I believe that the plan meets all the

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requirements of 1129. I've known Mr. Binford for a while and he's a man of his word.
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MR. GIBBS: As have I and I agree.

THE COURT: Thank you. Are you going to ask me to waive the 14-day stay on the plan?

MS. SPIGEL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Tell me why we're -- you're seeking to do that.

MS. SPIGEL: We don't think that there's any conditions that require the plan, you know, to -- for there to be a final and non-appealable order. We think that there's been no opposition and we would like for the plan and the settlement to go effective as soon as possible.

THE COURT: I don't think that's a valid reason under the rules to have cause to waive the stay so I'm going to take out paragraph two. I got it, that no one ever wants it there if you're going to win, right? But it's a valuable appellate right and we ought to have a good reason for removing it. No one has objected. I don't anticipate any appeal. But as has already been proven twice today, I can make mistakes in what I do. So I want to leave that here.

The draft has all the attachments to it. I'm signing the order right now. And if you'll give me one second, I'm going to get it sent to docketing. All right.

It'll be docketed in just a few minutes. Where did you want

to go now, Ms. Spigel?

MS. SPIGEL: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate it. Next I'd like to move to the motion to seal, which I'm going to defer to my colleague John Lawrence.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Lawrence, I see you. It's just taking me a minute to get it clicked. Good afternoon, Mr. Lawrence.

MR. LAWRENCE: Good afternoon, Your Honor, John Lawrence from Baker Botts on behalf of the Debtor.

Your Honor, at Docket 368, Debtor filed a motion to seal an exhibit that was attached to the expert report of Mr. Spencer. The only piece of that report that the Debtor seeks to seal is that one exhibit because it contains customer information. While it doesn't include names of customers or addresses or customer ID numbers, there is, as Your Honor knows from being able view it, separate rows for each customer and amounts paid and amounts owed by customers. And, Your Honor, because both the PUCT rules and the Griddy terms of service forbid Griddy from disclosing proprietary customer information, including identifying information that might show historical usage, the Debtor believes that caution is warranted here in sealing this information.

While we believe it would be very difficult and unlikely that somebody could use this information to

identify specific customers, the risk of doing so here pushes the balance against the report itself which relies on the information is fully public. And the spreadsheet does not, other than to someone, who's an expert like

Mr. Spencer, does not really inform the understanding of the report warrant caution here and for that reason, out of an abundance of caution, the Debtor would like to seal this exhibit so that it is not publicly viewable.

THE COURT: All right. Is there -- I do have one person that wants to address the sealing question. See if I have -- Ms. Whitworth, good afternoon to you.

MS. WHITWORTH: Good afternoon, Judge Isgur. Jana Whitworth on behalf of the United States Trustee. Your Honor, I just wanted to let the Court know and we have discussed this via email with the Debtor's counsel. It appears to the United States Trustee that the information is — that they're seeking to seal already has been redacted. All of the personally identifiable information has been redacted. And as we've made clear in prior hearings, our preference is to continue redaction rather than in sealing information. And I just wanted to let the Court know that the Trustee's position is that an already redacted report really should not be sealed. That's it, Judge. I just wanted to let the Court know that and that's our position.

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THE COURT: So why do we need to deal with this
document at all? I mean, I'm not going to use it. No one's
going to use it. It's unopposed.
         I have the report by Mr. Spencer, presumably he's
going to testify today. Is there a reason why it needs --
         MR. LAWRENCE: Your Honor, we --
         THE COURT: -- to be part of the record, why the
attachments need to be part of the record?
         MR. LAWRENCE: Your Honor, that is another
solution that is available. We did attach it because it's
something he relied on so that it's something that the Court
or others who are reviewing the report for the purposes of
any sort of examination could view and test. But it is --
as Your Honor has noted, it is not the sort of information
that I think that any reader of the report needs in order to
understand the report. So if Your Honor would prefer that
we simply unfile that exhibit and still have it as something
listed that he relied on but not have it as part of the
record before the Court, that is also a resolution.
         THE COURT: Ms. Whitworth, does that work for your
client?
         MS. WHITWORTH: Yes, Judge. It sure does.
         THE COURT: Does anyone object to the withdrawal
of Exhibit 1 to the Spencer report from the record
altogether?
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(No audible response)

Going to show that Exhibit 1 is withdrawn from the Court's record. Mr. Lawrence, that's without prejudice so if it turns out you get a surprise objection, you want to come back with it, we'll deal with this then. But I just think it's a matter not worth spending a whole lot of brain damage on given -- you're right. I've had the opportunity to look at it. And you're wrong if you think I've read the whole thing. I don't think he's read the whole thing in terms of every line. It's just the summary data. All right. It's withdrawn from the record. The motion to seal is now moot and we'll take no action on it.

All right. We're back to you, Ms. Spigel.

MR. LAWRENCE: Thank you, your -- thank you very much. The next item on the agenda is the final approval of the disclosure statement and confirmation of the plan. As I said on the first day of this case, the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the Debtor is unique. The winter storm event and extreme pricing destroyed Griddy's business and customers didn't pay their bills and ERCOT mass transitioned Griddy's customers to providers of last resort. Until the winter storm -- sometime during the winter storm, Griddy was solvent. And as I've mentioned before, Griddy's management actually took the unusual steps to try to get customers off its platform. But not all were able to do so.

So Griddy ended up filing this case as a liquidating 11 to try to do the right thing by all parties, including customers, since from our perspective the legislature and regulators haven't been able to provide that relief.

And the Debtor has worked very hard with many different parties, including the Committee, the Debtor's prepetition lenders, its non-debtor affiliates, and the State of Texas to make this plan in its current form work. I think everyone wants to see relief for the customers that want it, which is why people have been willing to provide substantial contributions and concessions in this case.

The Debtor, and with the overwhelming support of creditors and parties in interest, believe that maximizing value can also include providing relief for customers. And that's what the plan does. As I've noted several times I think, the plan has been overwhelmingly accepted by all the classes entitled to vote on the plan.

On May 26th, the Court entered an order conditionally approving the disclosure statements. That was at Docket Number 308. And solicitation commenced on the plan on May 28th.

June 25th was the deadline to object to final approval of the disclosure statement and confirmation of the plan. That was also the deadline to vote on the plan.

In accordance with the combined hearing order, the Debtor provided extensive notice of today's hearing. Specifically, written notice was provided to the United States Trustee for Region Seven, all impaired classes of claims and interest entitled to vote on the plan, counsel to the Committee, counsel to the State of Texas, all parties holding claims against the Debtor that's listed on the creditor matrix, including parties that have -- that filed prepetition actions against the Debtor. All parties have filed a notice of appearance in the case, the IRS, and all parties to the Debtor's executory contracts.

The Debtor also published notice of the combined hearing in the *The New York Times*, the national edition, the *Dallas Morning News*, and the *Houston Chronicle*. Appropriate affidavits of mailing and publication have been filed with the Court.

The following declarations have also been filed with the Court: the declaration of Angela Tsai of Stretto regarding solicitation of votes and tabulation of ballots, which was filed with the Court on July 1st, that's at Docket Number 363; the declaration of Roop Bhullar, the Debtor's Chief Financial Officer, was filed on July 2nd in support of, among other things, confirmation of the plan, and sets forth the basic factual predicates in support of the plan, that's at Docket Number 370. In addition, the Debtor filed

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the export report and declaration of Tony W. Spencer, which
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    was filed in support of confirmation and, in particular, the
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   proposed customer releases. That's at Docket Number 367.
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    Each of the declarants is on the phone and available for
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    cross examination with respect to the items set forth in
    their respective declarations. And unless there's any
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 7
    objections, we would move at this time to admit each of
    those declarations into evidence at the hearing.
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              THE COURT: Is there any objection to the
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    admission of the declarations identified by Ms. Spigel?
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          (No audible response)
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              They are --
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              MR. SPEAKER: No, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: -- each identified. Excuse me, they
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    are each admitted.
          (Debtor's Exhibits Numbers 363, 367, and 370 were
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    received in evidence)
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              Is there any party that wishes to cross examine
    any of the declarants? I do have someone. Hold on.
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   Mr. Lippman, and if this is an objection to admission of the
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    declarations you're not too late for that either. So tell
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   me what you got.
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              MR. LIPPMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I just want
    to speak just briefly with respect to the expert report of
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   Mr. Spencer. ERCOT doesn't oppose or otherwise take issue
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   with the opinions expressed by Mr. Spencer as expressed in
    the report. But Mr. Spencer's opinions are based in part on
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    the declaration of Michael Fallquist in support of the
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    Chapter 11 petition and first day pleadings, which is at
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    Docket Number 21. As the Court may recall at the first day
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   hearing, I expressed some concerns about the accuracy of
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    some of those statements contained in the declaration.
   ERCOT doesn't oppose the admission of Mr. Spencer's report
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    to the extent the Court's not making any findings on the
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    validity of the statement made by Mr. Fallquist in his
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    declaration.
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              THE COURT: Ms. Spigel, are you asking me by
    admitting and relying on Mr. Spencer's report that I would
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    also be relying on the Fallquist statements as being
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    truthful and accurate?
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              MS. SPIGEL: No, Your Honor. They -- no, Your
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   Honor. Those -- the expert did rely on those in making his
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    conclusion but we're not asking Your Honor to admit the
    Fallquist declaration into evidence --
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MS. SPIGEL: -- in connection with this hearing.
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              THE COURT: It's my understanding of an expert
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   report in the current state of the law that an expert can
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    rely on hearsay to come to conclusions but that the hearsay
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    itself does not come in as admitted or as statements of
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So

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fact. It's simply something that an expert can rely on.
    I will honor Mr. Lippman's request and not consider
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    independently the Fallquist statements and not admit the
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    Fallquist statements for the purpose of today's hearing. I
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    think that's what you're asking for, Mr. Lippman. I just
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    want to be sure.
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              MR. LIPPMAN: I am, Your Honor. Thank you very
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   much.
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              THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Does anyone
    now have any cross-examination for any of the declarants?
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          (No audible response)
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              All right. Ms. Spigel. You've got everybody
    under control --
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              MS. SPIGEL: Thank you.
              THE COURT: -- here, Ms. Spigel. Nobody's
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    objecting to anything.
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              MS. SPIGEL: We worked very hard for that, Your
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    Honor.
              There's other documents we'd like to move into
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    evidence. Would it be appropriate to do that now?
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              THE COURT: So far you're on a roll so you can
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    give it a shot.
              MS. SPIGEL: Okay. We would like to move into
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    evidence the disclosure statement, which includes the
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    liquidation analysis attached as Exhibit B. That's at
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Docket Number 312. 1 THE COURT: Any objection to the admission of the 2 3 disclosure statement? 4 (No audible response) 5 Disclosure statement is admitted. (Debtor's Exhibit Number 312 was received in evidence) 6 7 MS. SPIGEL: Thank you. We'd also like to admit 8 into evidence the plan supplements and the supplement to the 9 plan supplement. So that's at Docket Number 345 and 355. 10 There are separate documents. There's seven of them in 11 Docket Number 345, which is the original plan supplement. Do you want me to read which documents they are? 12 13 THE COURT: Is there any objection to the admission of 345 or of 355? 14 (No audible response) 15 (Debtor's Exhibits 345 and 355 were received in 16 17 evidence) 18 So I just want to make a brief comment on the 19 record. I've known now Mr. Nelms for a large number of 20 years. He served on the bankruptcy bench in the Northern District of Texas at the same time that I served on the 21 22 bankruptcy bench here. I hold him in high regard. That 23 said, and I don't regard myself as -- we've never gone to 24 dinner or anything like that. I think he's a good person.

But we're not friends in the sense of being social friends.

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We were business friends. I did not recommend him, and I think it would be inappropriate for me to be engaged in the retention of former colleagues because I have encouraged people to do that. I also don't think they are disqualified from serving merely because they are former colleagues. And I want the record clear that this was a selection that the parties made and not the Court. I have no problem with your selection. But I want to understand from you that you came across the concept of retaining former Judge Nelms with no input from the Court or any staff here or anything at all like that. And I just need you to confirm that. I think it's right. I know it's true about me but I -- you never know. So I want to be sure we didn't have anything to do with that. MS. SPIGEL: That is correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. MS. SPIGEL: We chose a -- we had to choose a mutually agreeable person between the Debtor and the Committee. And Judge Nelms was a natural choice to bridge the gap between the two. THE COURT: All right. Again, I just wanted that clear on the record --

MR. GIBBS: Your Honor, --

THE COURT: -- because I think it's important we retain the level of independence and separation that is

appropriate for the work we do. Mr. Gibbs, go ahead.

MR. GIBBS: For the record again, Chuck Gibbs with McDermott, Will, and Emery, counsel for the Committee. I just wanted the record to be clear. Judge Nelms was actually the person that the Committee recommended and I wanted Your Honor to know and the record to reflect that that was through no input by you, Your Honor, or anyone from the Court. It was based on our independent evaluation of Judge Nelms and concurrence with your statement regarding his capabilities and integrity. And it was our recommendation and negotiation with the Debtor was agreed to by the Debtor.

THE COURT: Mr. Gibbs, I appreciate that. I just -- it matters to me that people understand how these things happen and that it's not -- he isn't picked because of me, he's picked because of you all. And that's what matters to me. Okay. Ms. Spigel.

MS. SPIGEL: Thank you, Your Honor. I just -- I also just want to note that the Debtor filed a brief in support of confirmation and the proposed order approving the disclosure statement confirming the plan on July 2nd at Docket Number 376 and 378.

THE COURT: So I've reviewed the brief in full. I have not reviewed the order yet. They usually change my now so I try and wait on that. But I read the brief. Thank

you.

MS. SPIGEL: Thank you, Your Honor. There have been no changes to the confirmation order since we filed it.

So the objection to the plan and disclosure statement were required to be filed by the 25th of June. As I noted earlier, the Debtor received a few informal comments with the plan, all of which I'm pleased to report were resolved consensually and reflected in paragraphs 30 through 33 in the confirmation order. No formal objections were filed to the plan or the disclosure statement.

As Your Honor is aware, up until settlement with the Committee, the Committee spent substantial time seeking discovery and depositions from the Debtor. And although the depositions have been taken and extensive document requests have been provided, ultimately the Debtor and the Committee, the Debtor's prepetition lenders, and the Debtor's non-debtor affiliates came to a settlement agreement. And obviously I'll let Mr. Gibbs speak on behalf of the Committee but the Committee supports the plan.

If I may turn to approval of the disclosure statement on a final basis. As set forth in the Debtor's motion for approval of the disclosure statement, as well as the pleadings filed in support of the conditional approval of the disclosure statement and the Debtor's confirmation brief, the disclosure statement satisfies the requirements

in 1125. Each of those documents, as well as the records of the hearing on the conditional approval of the disclosure statement, highlights all of the types of information that was included in the disclosure statement. And we would respectfully submit that disclosure statement has the type of information necessary to allow holders to have made an informed judgment about the plan, and that the disclosure statement contains adequate information. There were no objections and we'd ask Your Honor to approve the disclosure statement on a final basis.

THE COURT: Thank you. Is there any other party that supports approval of the disclosure statement and confirmation of the plan that wishes to introduce any evidence in support?

(No audible response)

Is there any party that opposes either the approval of the disclosure statement or the confirmation of the plan that wishes to introduce any evidence against approval and confirmation?

(No audible response)

All right. I'm going to show that the evidentiary record is closed. This was such a difficult case. First I'll just start with the simple stuff, which is that on the disclosure statement we already conditionally approved it.

I see no reason why we didn't get that right the first time.

And nobody's filed any new. I -- for the same reasons I conditionally approved it I'm going to finally approve it.

It absolutely contains information to allow people to decide how to vote.

This is a very unique plan, as Ms. Spigel has mentioned, because a lot of the focus of the plan is on the Debtor releasing claims against customers as a swap, for lack of a better word, to be sure that the customers don't assert claims against the Debtors without ever admitting that the customers have any valid claims against the Debtors, or vice versa. By and large, the voting reflects an overwhelming basis that the customers like that idea. You know, they voted, again overwhelmingly, that if Griddy had done anything wrong, that they were going to swap a release of whatever liability they may have on their unpaid electrical bill in exchange for that.

With respect to electric customers who already paid their bill, they're going to get an unsecured claim and there will be distributions in some amount made on that unsecured claim initially. Maybe not as much as what people hoped for but better than nothing. And to date I have not seen any claim against Griddy that it seems to me would justify anybody not being willing to take that deal. So I don't think that I've seen rights against Griddy that appear to me to be valuable.

Nevertheless, no one was forced to take this. If

-- although the class had to accept as a class, every member

of the class had an opt-out right. And a few people opted

out and that's fine. They can, you know, have their perhaps

large claim in the unsecured creditor pool and perhaps have

somebody try and get them to pay their electric bill.

That's their choice and I think the disclosure statement

gave them a full opportunity to understand what they were

doing.

With respect to other creditors, you know, this is a company that failed overnight. And other creditors in general were going to get extremely low returns under the liquidation test. And what this does is it provides a small recovery for other general unsecured creditors.

The secured creditors who have some crossover with formation and ownership it's my understanding are giving up a substantial amount of money to be sure that this whole situation works. And, again, I've seen no valid claim against them either.

So this situation, the freeze, the failure, from what I have seen to date was in no way Griddy's fault. The amount of the bills were enormous. But they were driven not by Griddy but by others. And I don't know how that imposes liability on Griddy either. So I think that this is the best outcome in a difficult world.

I've read the brief. For the reasons set forth in the brief, all the requirements of Section 1129(a) with respect to confirmation have been satisfied. And we're going to confirm the plan.

So I'd like to put your order up on the screen and let you watch me as I make minor edits, if anything, to it and see if anyone has any problem with that. Unless you need some additional findings I should ask. If you need any additional oral findings, I know that you'll have quite a few in the draft order.

MS. SPIGEL: I -- Your Honor, it's Robin Spigel.

I do not but there is one paragraph in particular I want to make sure that I discuss with you because it's a -- is a new concept. It doesn't require re-solicitation, and I'll explain why, but I do want to make sure we get to that.

It's paragraph 14 of the confirmation order, so when we get there I just want to talk.

THE COURT: Why don't we start there?

MS. SPIGEL: Okay. So paragraph 14, which is on page 18 of the proposed order, essentially it relates to customers being able to opt-in to the releases. So almost all of the 145 customers, former customers, that opted out of the releases and the third party releases in class four owe the Debtor money. And while it's certainly their right to have done so, the Debtor and the Committee were concerned

that many of those customers may have done so inadvertently. And as a result, we thought that it made sense and in spirit of the plan to have included the ability of those people to opt-in to the customer releases with the caveat that they wouldn't have automatically allowed claims if they file those claims for the amounts that they paid for electricity usage. And the reason why we cleaved it in that way is because then if they had those allowed claims that would have adversely affected the treatment of class four and five, and we did not want to resolicit the plan.

THE COURT: Let me hear from others but I just don't have a problem with including this. Effectively, a lot of this plan is to get rid of litigation fights. And if somebody decides they made a mistake and they want to do it, withdraw their opt-out, which eliminates another fight, this makes sense to me. So you're not going to get any objection from me to it. I don't think it's a material change. I don't think it adversely affects other parties. But if someone does have an objection to it, some sort of, you know, it's not fair that they get to come in late kind of thing, please voice your objection and we'll hear it. But you're not going to get one from me.

MS. SPIGEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No one is wishing -- is asking to speak. Can you give me the ECF number to fill in right

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here?
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              MS. SPIGEL: It is number 376.
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              THE COURT: Thank you. So the appearance of all
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    interested parties having been made electronically, since we
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    didn't take oral appearances I think.
              MS. SPIGEL: Thank you.
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          (Pause)
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              MR. GIBBS: Your Honor, I don't have your proposed
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    order you're working from on my screen. Maybe others do and
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   maybe I'm just missing it.
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              THE COURT: You -- I apologize. Hold on.
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    that again. Let me go back up and show you what I've
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    changed. I haven't changed much.
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              MR. GIBBS: You're good.
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              THE COURT: You can see it now, right?
              MR. GIBBS: Yes. Thank you.
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              THE COURT: Okay. I filled in the document number
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    right there. I changed this from having taken judicial
    notice of all written and oral evidence to just say I've
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    considered it all because some of it I don't think is
    capable of judicial notice. Does this affect the 14-day
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    stay or is one of the conditions that this order be final?
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          (Pause)
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              MS. SPIGEL: I'm sorry. I was on mute.
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    apologize. It's Robin Spigel. Can you repeat the question?
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              THE COURT: Does 11.02 require that this order
   become final?
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              MS. SPIGEL: It does.
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              THE COURT: Thank you. So can I just tell you
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    that administratively this paragraph is very difficult to
    administer? If -- let me give you an example. If somebody
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    files a fee application five days after the effective date,
   my calendar is going to have that reviewed 26 days after the
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    effective date. And we're giving people 65 days to object.
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    Is there a reason why we can't give them 21 days after it's
    filed, which is normal? It'll just be a lot easier to
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    administer.
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              MS. SPIGEL: Absolutely that's fine, thank you,
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    Your Honor. That -- Your Honor, it's Robin Spigel. That
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    change also will need to -- we'll need to make it in the
    effective -- the notice of effective date attached to the
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    order.
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              THE COURT: Okay. You can make conforming changes
    to the event.
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              MS. SPIGEL: Okay. Thank you. Do you want her to
    -- this is Robin Spigel. Do you want me to walk through
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    these paragraphs or --
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              THE COURT: Probably helpful.
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              MS. SPIGEL: Okay. With respect to paragraph 30,
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    the issuer of a surety bond had asked for clarification in
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the confirmation order that the non-debtor affiliates were not released from their obligations. And there's nothing in the plan or the confirmation order that purports to provide non-consensual third party releases so we included that language for them.

In paragraph 31, as Mr. Binford had noted before, they wanted it to be clear in the order that they have opted out of the third party releases in Section 12.7(b) of the plan. And that obviously is a consensual release so that wasn't an issue for the Debtor either.

In paragraph 32, ERCOT had two general comments to the plan: one, that it be permitted to amend its claims without seeking authority of the court, and the second one is that the Debtor be required to obtain an order of the Court to estimate ERCOT's claim, both for reserve and distribution purposes. Since ERCOT's claim is the largest claim of the estate, other than I think a customer filed a \$10 billion claim, but putting that aside ERCOT's claim is the largest claim in the estate, we thought that it made sense on both of those accounts, one, in connection with its claims, I believe under its contract it has the ability to resettle certain amounts so it will probably have an amended claim, and it would be cost-effective not to have to come back to the Court to allow it to file its amended claim, as long as it's in compliance with applicable law, meaning that

they're not asserting new claims.

And then with respect to the certified, I explained that one.

And then on paragraph 33, counsel for Ms. Prescott and the alleged punitive class and tort claimants, in settlement of their plan objections they wanted to ask for a clarification regarding the lack of estoppel effect of the orders on parties not released under the plan. I know Mr. Monsour is on the line as well.

THE COURT: I don't have any problem with the concept. I'm trying to understand what the last sentence means.

MS. SPIGEL: The definition of tort claim.

arising in tort for the electricity and related fees, taxes, expenses and other costs. So it's the words -- I don't have a problem with what you're doing. I don't understand where it says: "including when the Public Utilities Commission of Texas imposes a \$9,000 per megawatt hour price for wholesale power," if they did that on February 20th, are we including that date? And let's assume they only did it on February 16th to 19th, are we including February 13th to 15th? Or should I just take out the including language because it's really just those dates? And I'm not sure what we're saying there and I don't want ambiguity. Probably ought to get

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Mr. Monsour on the phone to be sure that I'm understanding
  what the goal is and we get it done. Mr. Monsour, good
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  afternoon.
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MR. MONSOUR: Thank you, Your Honor, Trey Monsour for Karen Prescott. You can take out the language "after February 19th" because we were just trying to define the period of time by which the claims would have arisen, which is between February 13th and February 19th. So the including when the public utility commission of Texas imposed a 9,000 per watt, that was within that same timeframe so it's probably not necessary.

THE COURT: And does the Debtor have any problem with me taking out that language?

MS. SPIGEL: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. MONSOUR: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. So I am not inclined to order the plan administrator to preserve and protection the privileges and work product. What if he determines it's in his best interest to waive it? I think that what I ought to be saying here is the plan administrator has the exclusive authority over all applicable privileges and work product vested in liquidating Debtor. He can preserve it, he can protect it, he can waive it. But I think he ought to be able to do what he deems best. Is there a reason why it

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1
   shouldn't say that?
2
              MS. SPIGEL: No, Your Honor.
 3
          (Pause)
 4
              THE COURT: I think the rest of it works for me.
 5
              And I'm going to take this out. I don't think I
 6
   have cause to waive people's appellate rights.
7
              I sure don't like that parenthetical. Why are you
8
   asking me to do that? The plan has to control. I can't
 9
   authorize a conflicting document to control. What if
10
    there's a conflicting document that says, notwithstanding a
11
   bankruptcy case, the Debtor has to pay? Shouldn't I take
    that out?
12
13
              MS. SPIGEL: It's not an issue in this case. It's
14
    fine, thank you, Your Honor.
15
              THE COURT: Thank you.
          (Pause from 4:54 p.m. to 4:55 p.m.)
16
17
              MR. SPIGEL: Your Honor, I noticed --
18
              THE COURT: Yes.
19
              MS. SPIGEL: -- one knit (phonetic) while we were
20
    scrolling by but I didn't tell you. The liquidation
21
    analysis in paragraph 11 and -- or on page 11 and 12, it's
22
    actually Exhibit B, not Exhibit 2. So apologies for that.
23
              THE COURT: Hold on one second.
24
              MS. SPIGEL: Sure.
25
          (Pause)
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1
              THE COURT: Sorry. Where do you want me to go?
              MS. SPIGEL: On page 11 and 12.
 2
 3
              THE COURT: Okay.
 4
              MS. SPIGEL: It's paragraph L.
 5
              THE COURT: Okay.
              MS. SPIGEL: In two places in the first line it
 6
 7
    says: "Exhibit 2." It's actually Exhibit B. And then at
    the end of that paragraph it also says "Exhibit 2" but it's
 8
 9
    В.
10
              THE COURT: Thank you.
11
              MS. SPIGEL: Thank you.
12
              THE COURT: All right. Let me hear any objections
13
    to the form or the substance of the confirmation order as it
   has been edited on the screen.
14
15
          (No audible response)
              Hearing no objections, I've signed the order.
16
17
              MS. SPIGEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
18
              THE COURT: And let me get it to docketing. Hold
    on a second. All right. It'll be docketed shortly.
19
20
   Ms. Spigel, it's --
21
              MS. SPIGEL: Thank you.
22
              THE COURT: -- been a good day for you. What do
23
   you want to do now?
24
             MS. SPIGEL: Thank you, Your Honor. What I would
25
    like to do is actually thank you. I wanted to thank the
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Court for its time and patience and frankly guidance in respect to this case. As I said ad nauseum, it's a -- it is a unique plan, and I think it took a lot of thought by all parties, including Your Honor, to bring it over the finish line. And we very much appreciate, you know, your time and thoughts in this case. I think that the plan even represents an excellent outcome relatively speaking under the circumstances for all of the parties. And I'm glad that we were able to get all of the parties to make the contributions and concessions they were able to make.

I also would like to thank Mr. Fallquist and Mr. Bhullar, who are on the phone. Their efforts as well as the efforts of their members of management and the board, they really worked tirelessly to try to make sure that this company is wound down in the right way. And obviously they could've put the company in Chapter 7 but they didn't think that that was appropriate. And so I just wanted to thank them as well. So thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Spigel. I actually don't think I did very much except let you guys figure out how to solve this problem. And hopefully I was able to accommodate your needs in that regard, and you all did. It's a big problem for the State, big problem for our citizens. It's important we get it resolved. I appreciate the hard work that everyone did.

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1
              Does anyone have anything else that we should
 2
    cover today or any other comments that need to be said on
 3
    the record? Otherwise I'm going to adjourn and let you go
 4
    see your families.
 5
              MS. SPIGEL: Thank you.
 6
              MR. GIBBS: Thank you, Judge.
 7
              THE COURT: Mr. Gibbs, did you have something you
 8
    wanted to say?
 9
              MR. GIBBS: Oh, nothing, Your Honor. I apologize.
10
    I just said thank you.
11
              THE COURT: Oh, thank you, sir.
12
              All right. We're in adjournment. Thank you.
13
         (The parties thank the Court.)
         (Proceeding adjourned at 4:59 p.m.)
14
15
16
               I certify that the foregoing is a correct
17
    transcript to the best of my ability due to the condition of
18
    the electronic sound recording of the ZOOM/telephonic
19
    proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
20
    /S/ MARY D. HENRY
21
    CERTIFIED BY THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
22
    ELECTRONIC REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS, CET**337
23
    JUDICIAL TRANSCRIBERS OF TEXAS, LLC
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    JTT TRANSCRIPT #64241
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    DATE FILED: JULY 9, 2021
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